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Abstract—Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is becoming 
popular in the era of the internet of things (IoT) due to its 
lightweight implementation and unique feature of physically 
unclonable capability. However, it has been shown that PUF can 
be venerable to modeling attacks using machine learning based 
algorithms. For example, logic regression (LR) is used as an 
effective attack method to break Arbiter PUF (APUF) design. In 
this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of three different 
machine learning algorithms, including LR, Naïve Bayes, and 
AdaBoost, on attacking APUF design. A comparison of 
experimental results between theses algorithms is presented. The 
results show that the performance of the algorithms is related to 
the number of training data, the noise level involved in the APUF 
design and the number of stages in the generation of each bit 
response. It is found that the performance of LR is worse for a 
small number of data compared to the Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost 
algorithms. 
Keywords—Physical Unclonable Functions, Machine Learning, 
Modeling Attacks 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a promising 
lightweight security primitive for applications of the internet of 
things (IoT), which extracts random differences in integrated 
circuits (ICs) and produces a unique response. To a certain 
extent, PUF combines the features of biometric-based identity 
authentication and hardware-based identity authentication. As a 
new security hardware primitive, PUF is characterized by 
unpredictability, low cost, and unclonable capability. Currently, 
PUF has developed several architectures Depending on the 
number of challenge response pairs (CRPs), PUFs can be 
divided into strong PUFs and weak PUFs, which can be applied 
to low-cost authentication [1] [8] and security key generation [15], 
respectively. 
The security of PUF has been one of the main focuses of PUF 
research. The larger the number of CRPs, the easier the attacker 
to break a strong PUF. Additionally, most strong PUFs are based 
on a linear function architecture, which means that it is possible 
to read a large number of CRPs in a short time. Arbiter PUF [2] 
is one of the most widely studied PUF designs. Arbiter PUF can 
be successfully attacked by several machine learning algorithms, 
such as logic regression (LR) [3][4]. LR outperforms than other 
methods. With the high development of machine learning based 
techniques, it is interesting to investigate high advanced 
machine learning techniques to break PUF designs.  In this paper, 
a variety of classical machine learning algorithms for APUF 
attacks including LR, Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost is presented. 
Naïve Bayes is a simpler algorithm which is less sensitive to 
missing data. AdaBoost can combine weak classifiers into 
strong classifiers which has higher prediction rates than single 
weak classifiers. We perform attacks on APUF with three 
algorithms in a variety of cases and found that although the 
overall performance of LR is excellent, for the case of a small 
data set, the prediction rate of LR is not as good as Naïve Bayes 
and AdaBoost. The experiments show that Naïve Bayes and 
AdaBoost are more effective against small data sets. Specifically, 
our contribution to research can be summarized as follows: 
• Two machine learning algorithms including Naïve Bayes 
and AdaBoost, are utilized to attack APUF and compared with 
the results by LR. The prediction rates of various algorithms 
under different numbers of CRPs are provided. 
•The average prediction rates of the AdaBoost algorithm 
under different noise conditions are compared. 
•The effect of the number of stages on the prediction rates 
using three machine learning algorithms on APUF is presented. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces several classical algorithms of modeling attacks. In 
section III, the model of a 1-bit APUF design and the result of 
average prediction rate for APUF using several algorithms in 
different environment are presented. Finally, a conclusion is 
draw in Section IV. 
II. CLASSICAL MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 
A. Logistic Regression (LR) 
 LR is a common machine learning method for PUF attacks 
[4]. It is a linear classification model based on the maximum 
likelihood. For a traditional APUF with n stages, challenge 𝐶 =
𝑐1𝑐2 …𝑐𝑛  corresponds to response R ∈ {0,1} . The final 
decision boundary is decided by the sigmoid function as follows 
[10]: 
  ℎ𝜃(𝑥) = 𝜎(𝑥) = (1 + 𝑒
−𝑥)−1                    (1)                
where 𝜃 indicates weight of the sample. 
For a given training set T of an APUF, one of the samples 
can be represented as(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖). The probability of each sample 
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) is represented as follows: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 
       ∏ (𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖)
𝑦𝑖
(𝑖)
) (1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖)
1−𝑦𝑖
(𝑖)
)             (2) 
When the tag value is “1”, the expression represents the 
probability that 𝑃(𝑦 = 1, 𝑥𝑖); on the other hand, the formula 
expresses the probability of 𝑃(𝑦 = 0, 𝑥𝑖) when the tag value is 
“0”. 
 The logarithmic likelihood function can be expressed as 
𝑙(𝜃) = 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝜃) = 
∑ ∑ 𝑦(𝑖)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑖=1 ℎ𝜃(𝑥
(𝑖)) + (1 − 𝑦(𝑖))𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 − ℎ𝜃(𝑥
(𝑖)))𝑚𝑖=1 (3) 
 As the equation is difficult to solve directly, it is usually 
solved by iterative gradient descent method 
𝜃 ≔ 𝜃 − α𝛻𝜃𝑙(𝜃)              (4) 
where α is called learning rate (step size), which determines the 
rate of gradient descent. 
In general, LR is a probabilistic linear regression model. The 
dependent variable can be two-class or multi-classified. 
B. Naïve Bayes 
Naïve Bayes method is a classification method based on 
Bayesian theorem and feature condition independent hypothesis. 
The Naïve Bayes Classifier (NBC) originates from classical 
mathematical theory, which has a stable classification efficiency 
[11] [12]. 
The relationship between prior probability and posterior 
probability can be expressed as: 
              𝑃(𝑦|𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑦)𝑃(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛|𝑦)
𝑃(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)
                       (5) 
where 𝑥 indicates the feature while 𝑦 indicates the label. 𝑃(𝑦) 
represents the prior probability that can be obtained from the 
frequency of labels in the training set. The probability can be 
obtained according to the frequency of the response in the PUF 
training set. 
 Conditional independence hypothesis means independence 
between every pair of features. 
                     𝑃(𝑦|𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑦)∏ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑦)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑃(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)
                  (6) 
Naïve Bayes is one of the classic machine learning 
algorithms based on probability theory.  
C. AdaBoost 
AdaBoost [14] is an iterative algorithm and its core idea is to 
train different classifiers (weak classifiers) for the same training 
set and then group these weak classifiers to form a stronger final 
classifier (strong classifier). The block diagram of AdaBoost is 
shown in Fig. 1. 
Initially, the weight distribution of the training data is 
initialized according to number N, and each training sample is 
initially given the same weight. In this way, the initial weight 
distribution is as follows 
                 𝐷1(𝑖) = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑁) = (
1
𝑁
,… ,
1
𝑁
)                   (7) 
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Fig. 1. AdaBoost algorithm structure. 
Select a weak classifier h with the lowest error rate as the 
number t basic classifier, and calculate the error of the weak 
classifier on the distribution. The error rate is                                                                                                                    
         𝑒𝑡 = 𝑃(𝐻𝑡(𝑥𝑖) ≠ 𝑦𝑖) = ∑ 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝐼(𝐻𝑡(𝑥𝑖) ≠ 𝑦𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1           (8)  
 Calculate the weight of the classifier in the final classifier 
(weak classifier weight is denoted by α) 
                                𝛼𝑡 =
1
2
𝑙𝑛 (
1 − 𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡
)                                       (9) 
 Finally, combine the weak classifiers by weak classifier 
weights. Through the role of the sign function, the strong 
classifier can be expressed as follows                                                                                                                                                             
                                 𝐻 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∑ 𝛼𝑡𝐻𝑡(𝑥
𝑇
𝑡=1 ))                         (10) 
The AdaBoost algorithm is a modified Boosting algorithm, 
which can adaptively adjust the errors of weak classifiers.  
III. MACHINE LEARNING ATTACKS ON APUF 
A. Model of a 1-bit APUF Design 
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Fig. 2. The structure of APUF [2]. 
The architecture of a 1-bit APUF is shown in Fig. 2. For an 
n-bit APUF, an additive linear delay model can be described as 
[3][4][6][9]. The 1-bit response R, is decided by the final delay 
difference between the two delay paths, which can be expressed 
as 
                                         ∆= ω⃗⃗ Tφ⃗⃗                                                 (11) 
where the dimension of ?⃗?  and ?⃗?  is n+1. The parameter ?⃗?  
represents the delay for the subcomponents in the APUF stages 
as shown in (12), while the feature vectors ?⃗?  as shown in (13)  
shows the multiply results related to challenge C. 
 𝛿𝑖
0/1
 represents the delay in the stage i which includes a 
crossed path or an uncrossed path.  
                           ?⃗? = (𝜔1, 𝜔2, …，𝜔𝑘 , 𝜔𝑛+1)𝑇                       (12) 
where 𝜔1 =
𝛿1
0−𝛿1
1
2
, 𝜔𝑖 =
𝛿𝑖−1
0+𝛿𝑖−1
1+𝛿𝑖
0−𝛿𝑖
1
2
 for all 𝑖 =
2,… , 𝑛, and  𝜔𝑛+1 =
𝛿𝑛
0+𝛿𝑛
1
2
. 
                      ?⃗? (𝐶  ) = (?⃗? 1(𝐶  ), … , ?⃗? 𝑘(𝐶  ), 1)𝑇                       (13) 
where ?⃗? 𝑙(𝐶  ) = ∏ (1 − 2𝑏𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=𝑙  for 𝑙 = 1,… , 𝑛. 
According to the difference ∆, we can express output r of the 
A PUF by the sign function as:  
                                𝑟 = 𝜃(∆) = 𝜃(?⃗? 𝑇?⃗? )                                   (14) 
where θ(x) is called Heaviside step function and decide the final 
output, i.e., θ(x) = 0 if x < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  θ(x) = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 1 .  
B. Machine Learning Attacks on APUF 
The LR attack results on APUF are shown in [7]. In addition 
to the LR approach, Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost are presented in 
this paper. In this experiment, we use Python (version 3.6) 
simulation to implement APUF sample generation and various 
machine learning methods. In order to obtain accurate results, 
the experimental results in this work take the average of 100 
repeated samples. 
 
Fig. 3. The average prediction rates for 64-stage APUF. 
The results of the above machine learning algorithms for 
APUF are shown in Fig. 3. To predict the APUF design using 
different machine leaning algorithms, a group of tests on 
different numbers of training samples is performed. The 
prediction rates for 64-stage APUF with the numbers of training 
sample sets are 100, 500, 4000 and 8000, respectively. The 
number of test samples is set as the same as the training samples. 
For the case of a 64-stage APUF, a small number of data 
(such as CRPs=100) is tested, and the average prediction rate of 
Naïve Bayes is 84.30%, which is slightly higher than 79.05% of 
LR.  
 
Fig. 4. The average prediction rates for AdaBoost under different 
noise. 
Comparing theses different methods, it can be seen that LR 
is suitable for large data sets and has the best performance under 
large data sets. In addition, Naïve Bayes applies to smaller data 
sets and has the shortest training time. Meanwhile, AdaBoost 
has good performance for all conditions with the longest training 
time.  
In the Fig. 4, various noises are added to the original data in 
order to simulate the practical APUF under different noise 
conditions. Gaussian noises with variances of σ=0, σ=0.25, 
σ=0.5 and σ=1 are utilized. The experimental results show that 
the average prediction rate of the three attack methods has 
decreased compared with the noise-free case. Moreover, the 
AdaBoost algorithm is more sensitive to the noise. In the impact 
of noise, the prediction rate σ=1 when CRPs=100 is reduced by 
nearly 20% compared with σ=0. When the CRPs is greater than 
10,000, the prediction rate tends to be stable. σ=0.25 and σ=0.5 
are 2% and 4%, respectively, compared with the noise-free case, 
while σ=1 is only 78.44%, which is quite different. It can be 
found that the larger the noise, the lower the average prediction 
rate. 
 
Fig. 5. The average prediction rates for LR with different stages. 
An investigation of the effect of different stages of the APUF 
using three attack methods is described in Figs. 5-7. The results 
of the prediction rates of three different attacks, including LR, 
Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost, are presented in different numbers 
of CRPs. As the number of stages increases, the prediction rates 
of the three methods reduce.  During these, the impact of LR to 
the prediction rates of different numbers of stages is less than the 
others. Moreover, the prediction rate of APUF with the number 
of 256 stages is less than 2% lower than that of 64 stages when 
the number of training data is 20,000. The increment of the 
number of stages has made the attacks more difficult, and the 
prediction rate has relatively declined. It can be seen that when 
increasing the number of stages of APUF design, the security of 
the APUF can be improved. 
Fig. 6. The average prediction rates for NB with different stages. 
Fig. 7. The average prediction rates for AdaBoost with different stages. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
LR is a method known to be effective in estimating APUF in 
machine learning algorithms. In this paper, we use the machine 
learning algorithms, including Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost, to 
attack APUF and compare the results with LR. The average 
prediction rates of various algorithms under different numbers 
of CRPs are compared. Moreover, the average prediction rate of 
the AdaBoost algorithm under different noise conditions is 
presented. The higher the noise level, the more difficult the 
APUF to be attacked. The effects of the number of stages on the 
prediction rates of three algorithms are also demonstrated. The 
LR outperforms other methods in general. However, when the 
number of CRPs is small, it is not as good as other methods. In 
addition, for the 128-stage APUF, the average prediction rate of 
Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost reached 85.72% and 84.50%, 
respectively, while the prediction rate of LR was 80.02%. When 
the number of training data becomes larger, the prediction rate 
of LR is more accurate than Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost. For the 
AdaBoost algorithm, it performs well on data sets of various 
sizes. Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost achieves higher prediction 
rates than LR for a small number of training data. 
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